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Abstract
The current decline in political participation is a great cause of concern 
among political scientists, opinion makers and political leaders. There are two 
main approaches to this decline that occurs especially in Europe. The first one 
is the ‘modernization’ thesis. The second is the ‘social individualization’ thesis. 
Nevertheless, the empirical debate has not been successful in providing a detailed 
record of the relations between social capital and political participation. Much of it 
is due to a reductionist use of both concepts’ operationalization.
In this article we have two main goals. Firstly, we showed that the concepts 
of social capital and political participation are, theoretically and empirically, 
multidimensional concepts. Secondly, we assessed, through multivariate regression 
analyses, the explicative capacities of the more traditional political participation 
explanatory models: ‘the individual resources model’ and the ‘civic voluntarism 
model’ together with the more recent ‘social capital relational model’. 
Introduction
The concept of social capital is far from being new despite its enormous 
influence. Robert Putnam mostly holds the credit for recovering and universalizing 
the concept through his pioneer work Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in 
Modern Italy (1993), written with Robert Leonardi and Raffaela Nanneti. However, 
its origins go back to the nineteenth century and Alexis de Tocqueville, in his work 
Democracy in America (1835/1840), can be held as its great inspirer.
Still, the first authors in the twentieth century to systematically develop the 
concept of social capital were two sociologists: Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1993, 
1999). In one of the very first publications in this area Pierre Bourdieu defined 
social capital as ‘made up of social obligations (‘connections’)’ and underline the 
fact that we are dealing with relations between individuals within specific groups 
or categories (Bourdieu 1986, p. 246). Coleman developed a similar approach but 
stressed the common aspects of social capital by their functions: They all consist 
of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals 
who are within the structure (1990, p. 302). Putnam (1993) further improved 
the concept to address ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). Therefore, high social capital communities should 
act together collectively more often than low social capital communities. Thus, 
many authors defend these social-relation-based resources were expected to be 
particularly effective in solving problems that lack collective cooperation, often 
called ‘dilemmas of collective actions,’ ‘the prisoner’s dilemma, ‘ ‘the free-rider 
problem,’ (Coleman, 1990a, 1990b; Putnam, 1993).
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Accordingly, the results of higher levels of social capital were usually associated 
with benefits or gains in productivity, efficiency, or cooperativeness (Coleman, 
1999; Fukuyama,1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 2000). 
Researchers who were particularly interested in revealing how an individual’s 
participatory behavior in the political arena could be facilitated by these social 
resources have examined the roles of what they have termed distinctively as ‘social 
capital serving civic ends’ (Putnam,1995), or ‘politically relevant social capital’ (La 
Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998).
Despite the frequent use of the term political participation, its terminological 
vagueness leaves room for different definitions. This also applies to the study of 
political participation which is comprehensively and simultaneously defined as 
‘being part of’ and ‘taking part in’, i.e. as the ability and right to belong to a certain 
political community, on the one hand and, on the other, as the ability and right 
to take part in a certain political act or process, or participate in political decision 
formation (Schultze, 1998, p. 470).
Even though they social capital and politicalparticipation are not synonymous. 
Although there is a thesis formed in these last decades that draw the concept 
of social capital and political participation together, making the first one of its 
independent or explicative causes. By this we mean the thesis of the ‘decline of 
political participation’. In effect, according to some scholars, there has been a 
decline in political participation in the last three decades or so, which was associated 
by Putnam in ‘Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital’, fundamentally to 
the decline of some dimensions of the social capital stock. Having for reference the 
data of General Social Survey, the author suggests that the social capital is eroding 
in USA, for force of the ‘movement of women into the workforce’, the ‘re-potting 
hypothesis and other demographic changes have made impact on the number 
of individuals engaging in civic associations, but also and mainly technological 
‘individualizing’ of leisure time via television, Internet and eventually ‘virtual reality 
helmets’.
It is no surprise that the topic of political participation has been widely covered 
recently among academics, journalists and politicians in most liberal representative 
democracies. These concerns are mainly the decline in voter turnout and growing 
electoral volatility (Blais and Rubenson, 2013), the decrease of partisan identification 
(Garzia, 2013; Thomassen and Rosema, 2009), as well as partisan affiliation and 
activism (Whitetely, 2011) and other mainstream political activities.
Social Capital and Political Action Repertoires
There are two main approaches to the thesis of the ‘decline of political 
participation’ observed in the last decades.  The first one is the ‘modernization 
thesis’, which finds in Inglehart (1977, 1990; 1997) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) 
some of its most representative authors among many. Secondly, we have the ‘social 
individualization’ or ‘social atomization’ thesis, with Robert Putnam and his theory 
of social capital as one of its most prominent authors.
As a forerunner of cultural modernization theories, Ronald Inglehart claimed 
there was a substantial transformation in the values prioritization among modern 
industrialized societies (1990; 1997). With this transformation, post-materialistic 
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values overlap traditional materialistic values. This cultural change in mass public 
values will have led to a deepening of democratic values, a larger participation and 
political intervention in public life by citizens, together with the great support for 
the improvement of the functioning of democratic institutions and the creation of 
alternative political intervention channels.
‘Critical citizens’ (Norris, 1999. 2002), ‘post-materialistic citizens’ (Inglehart, 
1997) or ‘disaffected citizens’ (Torcal and Montero, 2006) would focus their civic 
energy in those new ways of political participation, characterized by direct action 
(without the interference of parties that represent them) and carried out by non-
hierarchical organizations marked by their horizontality, fluidity, pragmatism, direct 
mobilization form through the new information and communication technologies, 
namely the Internet and punctual in time.
Be that as it may, when treating empirically many researchers argue that the 
alleged decline in political participation observed in previous studies might be due 
to a measurement artifact: in focusing solely on the level of political participation, 
these studies failed to consider possible new forms and patterns of political 
participation (Dalton, 2008, Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). Still, it has been argued that 
researchers should focus more on the structure of political participation and not 
only on participation levels.
Social Capital and Political Participation Explanatory Models
One of the main goals of this article is to identify if, and to what extent, social 
capital strengthens both conventional and unconventional participation. Our 
research consists of empirical verification in several European regions with stronger 
and consolidated democracies and weaker ones still in consolidation. Many 
different theories have been discussed to explain who becomes involved in political 
action,some have been more or less fashionable at different times.
Consequently, we will seek to compare the more traditional explanatory models 
of political participation:  the ‘individual resources model’and the ‘civic voluntarism 
model’ with the more recent, yet less explored, ‘social capital relational model’.
A brief revision of existing literature in this area is suffices to show how much 
we still must learn regarding the causes of political participation (Leighley, 1995, 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Thus, it is no surprise that researchers have 
shifted their main focus from individual resources and attitudes associated with 
participation to social interactions regarding individual levels of participation 
(‘social capital resources model’).
One of the possible reasons for this gap is the surely the fact that social interactions 
are apparently always present in any act of participation, therefore not allowing 
a classification that sets participants in political life apart from non-participants. 
Another reason is that if existent literature has underlined the importance of formal 
interactions, such as belonging or activism in voluntary organizations, as a cause 
of political participation (Leighley, 1995; Radcliff and Davis, 2000), it has, however, 
omitted the importance interactions in interpersonal or informal networks may 
assume in political participation, perhaps due to empirical analysis difficulties.
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Reaction to the Unitary View of Social Capital and Its Effects on Political 
Participation
So far it has been assumed that social capital has the capacity to increase 
political participation. As a matter of fact, such assumption implicitly derives from 
Putnam’s pioneering work (1993) where he exemplifies how civic engagement as a 
social capital asset led to various participatory processes for a working democracy. 
However, precisely how and why such a connection to non-political organizations 
stimulates political participation has not been widely recognized as a study worthy 
empirical issue (Erickson and Nosanchuck, 1990; Levi, 1996). Putnam fails to pursue 
his inquiry and never fills the gap between social and political participation. He 
simply juxtaposed two chapters (2 and 3), as if the relationship between the two 
forms of participation was a matter of common sense.
Nevertheless, the empirical debate has not been successful in providing a 
detailed record of the relations between social capital and political participation, 
as claimed by some authors. This is much due to an insufficient and reductionist 
use of both concepts’ operationalization. It is true that Putnam makes a distinction 
between different forms of social capital, but, as Bjørnskov (2006) stresses, in his 
conception of social capital trust, norms and networks are all different aspects of 
the same functional notion (p. 23). In support of a unitary concept, he argues that 
individuals congregate in different types of voluntary organizations where they 
learn to trust each other through ‘repeated interaction’.
This shortcoming happens partly due to the dominance of Putnam’s work and, 
consequently, the inability to draw on a wider and more sophisticated theoretical 
framework. Putnam’s theory, although innovative, has struggled to explain how 
social capital forms – ‘the so-called circularity problem’ (Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 
1998). Such limitation has hindered the possibility of researching the different 
dimensions social capital can have and stress the importance of recognizing these 
multiple dimensions in terms of statistical measurement.
In order to overcome such methodological and measuring problems, it is 
essential that both concepts be treated as a unitary concept, gathering different 
attributes. This implies that one must stop using one-dimensional additive indexes 
to measure social capital and political participation and start seeing both as 
multidimensional phenomena.
The theoretical approach described above developed as a reaction to the unitary 
view of social capital and its effects (Bjørnskov, 2006; Woolcock, 1998). Such view 
argues that social capital can possess different dimensions and sub-dimensions— 
combinations of dissimilar social relationships (structural and cognitive) — and 
such dimensions are linked to also diverging political participation modalities.
Social Capital and its Operationalization
Our empirical analysis compares the multifaceted composition of social capital 
in six predefined European regions. The regions are: 1) Northern Europe (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden); 2) Western and Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland); 3) Britain and Ireland; 4) Southern 
Europe (Greece, Spain and Portugal) and 5) Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and the Baltic Countries (Estonia and 




As stated above, it is consensual that social capital is an especially complex and 
problematic concept due to its multidimensional nature. 
If we were to adopt Putnam’s definition (1993, 2000) — which, even with 
great criticism around it, is still the starting point of many scientific analyses — we 
would easily identify its components and integrate them in structural and cognitive 
dimensions. According to Putnam (1993), social capital includes ‘the features of 
social organization, such as networks, social norms and trust that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). 
Social norms and networks ‘provide defined rules and sanctions for individual 
participation in organizations’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 166), and promote reciprocity and 
cooperation ‘founded on a lively sense of mutual value to the participants of such 
cooperation, not a general ethic of the unity of all men or an organic view of society’ 
(Putnam, 1993, p. 168). On the whole, networks and norms provide a mechanism 
for such an internal mutual commitment where ‘rational individuals will transcend 
collective dilemmas’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 167).
Social Networks Dimension
In the fifth round of the ESS (2010), the participation in informal social networks 
can measured by two survey questions that ask people ‘How often do you meet 
socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?’ and ‘Compared to other people 
of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?’ The ESS 
contains two survey questions that can be used to measure the participation in 
formal social networks. People are asked ‘Are you or have you ever been a member 
of a trade union or similar organization? If yes, is that currently or previously?’ and 
‘During the last 12 months have you participated in a voluntary organization or 
association?’
Social and Institutional Trust Dimension
Trust and trustworthiness are integral elements of reciprocity. Information 
regarding the trustworthiness of others is an essential input to the reciprocal 
decision of an individual of whether he will cooperate or not. That the norm of 
reciprocity prevails in a society implies that a significant proportion of individuals 
in it are trustworthy. 
What he defines as ‘generalized reciprocity’ can be summed up as short-
term altruism grounded on the expectation of a long-term benefit can facilitate 
cooperation and make trusting relationships easier to maintain while suppressing 
self-interest or opportunism (Putnam, 1993, pp. 182-183). We used three survey 
questions from the ESS and built an index which allowed us to measure generalized 
trust: 1) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 2) Do you think that most people 
would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be 
fair? 3) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they 
are mostly looking out for themselves? This three-item scale can be considered 
reliable, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .860
Concerning institutional trust, we make a important distinction between (1) 
trust in institutions on the representation side of the political system (parties and 
parliament) and (2) trust in institutions on the implementation side (government 
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and legal system), in accordance with the existing questions in the Social European 
Survey to measure the institutional confidence, being in this case the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha 942.
Civic Norms and Awareness Dimension
This dimension refers neither to people’s relations with others nor to their trust 
in others, but to specific behavioral traits do they demonstrate. What matters most 
is the reciprocity, cooperation and civic commitment of people. Social norms often 
facilitate more predictable or beneficial behavior patterns of individuals. In fact, it is 
hard to imagine how interaction and exchange between strangers could take place 
without norms.
According to Putnam, ‘reciprocity’ is clearly the underpinning norm amongst 
social norms, which is strongly reflected by the ethics of ‘do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you’. We used the following questions to measure civic 
norms and civic consciousness in 2010’s ESS: ‘How wrong is it to make exaggerated 
or false insurance claims?’, ‘How wrong is it to buy something that might be stolen?’ 
and ‘How wrong is it to commit a traffic offense?’
At this point it is important to state that our basic assumption and research 
proposal in this sub-section is: theoretically, social capital constitutes a 
multidimensional concept. Empirically, it is not an unitary concept that can be 
translated in a complex index based in the sum of different indicators but a stable 
and multifacetedsocialconstruct, although the relative importance of alternative 
social capital components or dimensions may differ in European regions with 
different overall economic and political development levels. Therefore, the 
following research hypothesis states that:
H1a. Social capital is a multidimensional concept and its components are robust 
and similar in European regions. 
To test the empirical validity of social capital’s multidimensionality we used 
an exploratory factor analysis. This analysis was conducted using the principal 
components method with varimax rotation. First, we used the Kaiser criterion to 
decide the number of factors. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant. The KMO 
test statistic is .802, showing that the factor solution is good and stable. Altogether, 
the five extracted factors explain 62.68% of the total variance of 15 initial indicators 
included in the analysis. The saturations of the variables in each factor are always 
above the required minimum of 40%. The table 1 shows the associations between 
the factors (or dimensions) and variables:
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Table 1. Factors of Social Capital
The structure of social capital components would be further clarified by a 
confirmatory factor analysis. Since the exploratory analysis gives us the factors that 
can be correlated to each other, we use them here as input in the first-order CFA.
This enables the structure and aggregation possibilities of social capital indicators 
to be further clarified, as we can see in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Global Model of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Standardized Estimates) 
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The findings of CFA show that the loadings are high (M > 0.500) and significant 
(p < 0.001). The internal reliability is verified by the composite reliability (higher 
than 0.7). The extracted variance is higher than 0.5 for most dimensions. On the 
other hand, they also demonstrate that all dimensions show significant correlations. 
Lastly, they reveal that measurements indicate a good fit according to CFI (CFI > 
0.90), RMSEA (RMSEA < 0.08) and NFI (NFI > 0.80), but not according to Chi-square 
(p < 0.05), which is affected by the large sample dimension and CFI.
At this point, we can conclude that our first research hypothesis (H1a) is 
theoretically and empirically valid. The proposition stating that the concept of 
social capital is multidimensional is empirically valid (see Figure 1) in all European 
regions. Moreover, its components are robust in all regions, i.e. social capital has an 
unchanging structure or composition in Europe’s regional context.
The Operationalization of Political Participation
The concept of social capital has not been the only one approached in an 
empirically reductive way. We can extend such criticism to the concept of political 
participation. Therefore as with social capital, political participation should be 
operationalized in a multidimensional way. To that end we first used an exploratory 
factor analysis and secondly a confirmatory factor analysis. Our research hypothesis 
suggests that:
H2b: Political participation is a multidimensional concept and its components 
are similar and robust in European regions.
There are many mainly dichotomy classifications that distinguish institutional 
from non-institutional participation or conventional from unconventional 
participation, and they tend to use different criteriato differentiate the types 
or modalities of political participation that should or should not be part of both 
political action repertoires in the context of advanced industrial democracies. 
In this article, we will follow the conceptualization of political participation 
provided by Ekman and Amnå (2009). Indeed, it serves the purpose of mapping 
political participation in its various forms, which is in line with our objectives. They 
consider political participation to be composed of a ‘manifest’ and a ‘latent part’. 
‘Manifest’ political participation comprises parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
forms of activism. The ‘latent’participation and its forms refer to behaviors and 
types of engagement that could be of great significance for future manifest political 
actions, such as activities based on personal interest to politics and societal issues 
(Ekman andAmnå, 2009). 
In other words, while ‘manifest political’ participation refers to activities 
intended to influence actual political outcomes by targeting relevant political or 
societal elites (which is more than just electoral participation), in ‘latent’ political 
participation, ‘the notion of latency is based on the simple observation that citizens 
actually do a lot of things that may not be directly or unequivocally classified as 
‘political participation’, but at the same time could be of great significance for 
future political activities of a more conventional or unconventional type. If we are 
interested in declining levels of political participation’ (Ekman and Amnå, 2009, p. 
8), we must not underestimate such potential political forms of engagement.
In the fifth round of the ESS, ‘latent participation’ is measured by the following 
questions ‘How interested would you say you are in politics?’, ‘How much of this 
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time is spent reading about politics and current affairs?’, ‘How much of your time 
listening to the radio is spent listening to news or programs about politics and 
current affairs?’, and  ‘How much of your time watching television is spent watching 
news or programs about politics and current affairs?’.
Such questions can be indicators of higher political participation in the future. 
However, we also assume a set of attitudes related to the potential future of political 
protest (semi-legal or illegal) in the sphere of ‘latent participation’, thus recognizing 
the growing part it has been playing in present societies — some talk about the ‘art 
of protest’ as an increasingly generalized form of political action. Here we used the 
following questions from the ESS: ‘Do you consider you don’t have the duty to obey 
police decisions if you disagree with them?’ and ‘Do you consider you don’t have to 
do what the police says, even when you don’t understand or agree?’
As to ‘manifest participation’1, the ESS questions we found most fit to measure 
it are divided in two distinct sets. The first asks respondents whether they have ‘...
contacted a politician, government or local government official?’, ‘...worked in a 
political party or action group?’, ‘...worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?’, 
‘worked in another organization or association?’, and can be of greater importance 
at the level of conventional political participation forms.  In the second set we 
tried to measure the respondents who choose less conventional forms of political 
participation: ‘...signed a petition?’, ‘...taken part in a public demonstration?’, and 
‘boycotted certain products?’.
In order to test the similarities and differences of the political participation 
structure in European regions, we performed the exploratory factor analysis on 
pooled data (N = 38.974). The exploratory factor analysis was conducted using 
the principal components method with varimax rotation. First, we used the Kaiser 
criterion to decide the number of factors. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant. 
The KMO test statistic is .656, showing that the factor solution is good and stable. 
Altogether, the seven extracted factors explain 54% of the total variance of 12 initial 
indicators included in the analysis. The results also show that the indicators of social 
capital are clearly divided into two groups describing the predefined dimensions 
of political participation (i.e., latent participation and manifest participation), and 
every indicator corresponds to the expected dimension. The saturations of each 
factor’s variables are always above the required minimum of 40%. Thetable 2 
illustrations the associations between the factors and variables:
1 In manifest political participation, we do not consider here the parliamentary 
forms of activism, which are not included in European Social Survey.
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Table 2. Factors of Political Participation
Afterwards, we undertook a confirmatory exploratory analysis. It allowed us 
to confirm the adjustment degree of observed data to the typology of political 
participation we adopted. In Figure 2 we can see the results of the global 
confirmatory analysis model:
Figure 2. Global model of confirmatory factor analysis (standardized estimates) 
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The findings of CFA indication that there is convergent validity in all dimensions, 
since saturations are high and significant and so is construct consistency, with the 
relative exception of the ‘conventional political participation’ dimension. They all 
show that all dimensions present significant correlations. Lastly, we have a good 
structural adjustment of the model in all its evaluation criteria, whether we take 
into account Chi-Square (p > .005), CFI (p > 0.90), RMSEA (p < 0.08) and NIF (p > 
0.80).
At this point we can conclude that the concept of political participation 
is multidimensionaltoo (see Figure 2) in all European regions. Moreover, all 
components are identical for all regions. The concept’s structure is consistent and 
unchangeable, as occurs with the concept of social capital.
Theorizing Individual Drivers of Political Participation
How does biographical availability shape political participation?
Literature on participation focuses on four major factor groups that shape 
political participation: resources model, political attitudes model, social capital 
model and institutional opportunities and constraints models. Using ESS data, we 
will sequentially explore the first three of these models of explanation. Afterwards, 
we will examine their interaction through a multivariate regression analysis of 
political participation.
The earliest major empirical studycarried out by Verba and Nie (1972) that 
covered the entire range of political actions taken in the United States used 
resource-based explanations of behaviour. People participated in politics, who had 
the resources to do so; this placed variables such as education, occupation and 
income – the ‘socio-economic status’ (SES) –at the centre of the analysis.
Many previous studies of political participation found the causal foundations of 
political activity in class and other socioeconomic and demographic variables. For 
instance, older citizens have been regularly identified as more likely to engage in 
political activities than young ones since the elderly have greater experience and, 
typically, a greater stake in society that they need to defend. Those with greater 
socioeconomic resources, as evidenced by higher income levels, can apply them 
in their political activity (e.g. greater contributions to political candidates, parties 
or campaigns) and, of course, have a greater property stake at risk in the political 
sphere, which they may wish to protect through participation in politics (Brady, 
Schlozmanand Verba, 1995). 
In turn, educated citizens usually participate more in politics than less educated 
ones since they show better political abilities and, therefore, hold more information 
regarding the importance of political affairs as well as a better perception of their 
proximity and influence over political decision-making 
How do civic and political attitudes and behavior can shape political participation?
In the 1990s, the SES approach was supplemented to create an extended 
model known as ‘civic voluntarism’ (Verba, Scholzman and Brady, 1995), which 
included other resource aspects, such as time, money, civic skills, as well as political 
engagement and involvement in major social institutions. People participated in 
politics if they had the resources – and the opportunity – to take part. People who 
are more motivations and civic and social resources could be seen as having more 
opportunities, and were thusmore likely to participate. 
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Political participation as a basis of democratic citizenship has also been 
traditionally understood as the result of rational choices made by individuals who 
are motivated, are informed and capable of participating. Empirical studies have 
subsequently focused on the extent to which individual-level variables account 
for both the willingness (‘psychological predisposition’) to take part or engage in 
various political activities. In those ‘psychological predispositions’, four elements 
are eventually taken into consideration by Verba, et al. (1995): political interest, 
political efficacy and sophistication political information and partisanship. As Verba, 
et al. (1995, p. 354) summarize it: ’interest, information, efficacy and partisan 
intensity provide the desire, knowledge and self-assurance that impel people to be 
engaged by politics.’
On the other hand, the instrumental considerations should be seen as a 
separate set of motivations and they will have their own place in the model. These 
‘instrumental motivations’ are motivations which are rationally relevant to include 
in the decision to participate or not. This instrumental motivation is expected to have 
a positive effect on political participation since it is the issues that motivate a citizen 
to defend their interests. We should also consider the theory of rational choice, 
which is arguably the dominant approach in the analysis of political behaviour. A 
rational choice approach would predict that only people who perceive the benefits 
of taking part in political action to be greater than the costs are likely to participate.
However, looking at political participation - or the lack of it - as a function of 
these individual-level influences has, however, left much room for challenged and 
contradictions. Therefore, researchers in political science began to seek alternative 
mechanisms to better describe the democratic participatory process. Among 
other things, relational and social contexts in which individual choices are made 
and behaviors take place drew particular attention. For example, Uslaner (2003) 
proposed that motivations for individuals to take part in political activities could be 
modified by sociability or group consciousness that adds incentives to narrow self-
interest. This attention shift to social factors made up for the remaining deficiencies 
of individual capabilities or motivation regarding different levels of political 
participation. Political participation does occur as a rational outcome and the lack 
of it may be overcome when it is mobilized by socially interested.
How do social capital dimensions shape political participation?
Here we must mention social capital theory. Coleman (1999a, 1999b) affirms 
that this ‘embededness’ of individual choices in social relations can occur while 
individuals use specific resources. Defining them as ‘social capital’, he posited that 
they contribute to ‘facilitate certain actions of actors within the social structure 
that in its absence would not be possible or could be achieved only at a higher 
cost’ (Coleman, 1999b, p. 304). Putnam (1993) further improved the concept to 
mean ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’ (Putnam, 1993, 
p. 167). 
According to Knack and Keefer (1997), individual participation in political affairs 
is regarded as ‘civic duty’, based mainly on cooperative norms or social expectations 
with less regard to costs and benefits. Smith (2002) holds a similar view. He argued 
that political disengagement is a problem of ‘too few opportunities and resources, 
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or too little cooperation upon shared interests’ rather than too much individual 
freedom to avoid participation. Coleman (1990b, 1990) and Putnam (1993, 2000) 
based on their account of results that undermine collective action, offer a rationale 
that supports seeing political participation as an outcome of social resources.
According to these authors, both the free-rider behavior and its opposite, 
‘an excess of zeal’, occur under the same structure of interests, where these are 
all realized by the same outcome. What determines the prevalence of zealous 
involvement over free riding is whether or not additional incentives exist ‘to reward 
the others for working towards the outcome’ (Coleman, 1990b,p. 275).
In other words, the work of social resources, i.e. encouraging others or 
providing positive sanctions, explains a unique aspect of political participation 
that otherwise would have simply been avoided. Smith (2000) argued further that 
individuals are capable of altering situations not only by just ‘reacting’ to these 
resources, but also by ‘acting’ cooperatively and pooling resources to overcome the 
perverse incentives. In summary, taking social relations into consideration beyond 
the individual-level influence of capability, motivation or information can redefine 
issues of political participation in terms of the abundance or lack of available social 
resources.
It then becomes important to examine how the general constitution of social 
resources (dimensions) actually works to facilitate political participation. In this 
specific debate, social capital is supposed to increase the capacity for political 
action and thus enhance the likelihood that individuals are politically engaged.
Methodology and Hypotheses
We thus have established three general areas from which relevant hypotheses 
about political participation b can be drawn and tested: resources or bibliographical 
availability, psychological predisposition or political engagement and social resources 
(social networks, social and institutional trust, norms and social cohesion). Before 
we discuss our findings, we need to describe our hypotheses and look more closely 
at some keymethodological challenges.
Based on the arguments presented in the previous section, we tested the 
following research hypotheses.
H3 - The model that best explains citizen political participation is that of the 
‘social capital relational model’ when compared to alternative theoretical models 
from the ‘individual resources model’ or by ‘civic voluntarism model’. 
If we look exclusively to the ‘social capital relational model’, we can assume the 
following research sub-hypotheses:
H3b. Social networking is positively related with latent interest in politics and 
negatively related with latent potential for political protest (or civic disobedience).
H3b. Social networking is positively related with conventional political 
participation and negatively related with unconventional political participation and 
civic disobedience.
H4b. Institutional trust is positively related with latent political participation, 
i.e., interest in politics, and negatively related with latent potential for political 
protest (or civic disobedience).
H4b. Institutional trust is positively related with conventional political 
participation, and negatively related with unconventional political participation.
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H5a. Social and generalized trust is positively related with latent political 
participation, i.e., interest in politics, and negatively related with latent potential 
for political protest (or civic disobedience).
H5b. Social and generalized trust is positively related with manifest conventional 
political participation and negatively related with manifest unconventional political 
participation. 
H6b. Civic consciousness is positively related with latent political participation, 
i.e., interest in politics, and negatively related with latent potential for political 
protest (or civic disobedience).
H6b. Civic consciousness is positively related with manifest conventional 
political participation and negatively related with manifest unconventional political 
participation. 
In order to test these hypotheses we used three regression analyses separately 
related to the three explanatory models of political participation. The next step was 
a regression model with the variables that are specific to all three models in order 
to compare their performances with each other.
The following empirical analysis compares the three explicative models of 
political participation in six predefined European regions. The regions are: 1) 
Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden); 2) Western and Central 
Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland); 3) 
United Kingdom and Ireland; 4) Southern Europe (Greece, Spain and Portugal); 5) 
Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and 6) 
Baltic Countries (Estonia and Lithuania).
Findings
We began by testing the ‘individual resources model’, which focuses on 
the sociodemographic profile or bibliographical availability of citizens. Its main 
characteristics are independent or explicative variables, and the dependent or 
explained variables are the factors resulting from the confirmatory factor analysis 
of political participation. Table 3, in Appendix A, shows that individual resources 
are important in all considered types of political participation, especially in latent 
participation and at the level of conventional participation regarding forms 
of manifest participation. The predictors of latent and conventional political 
participation match the specialized literature.
It is men with higher formal instruction and greater income those who participate 
more in public life, both in latent and manifest forms. Still regarding manifest 
participation, we see that those who choose unconventional forms of participation 
are younger (ß= -.035), higher educated (ß= .026) and have less income (ß= -.053). 
In turn, those who reveal greater latent predisposition to resort to radical protest 
actions, including civil disobedience, are characterized especially by the fact that 
they are men, have a higher level of formal instruction and, in a complementary 
fashion, a lower level of socioeconomic income and are also outside of the labor 
market (See Appendix A).
As to what regards inter-regional differences, these do not exist at the latent 
or manifest levels, if we take into account only conventional and unconventional 
political participation. This does not happen if we take into account the potential 
predisposition of individuals to participate in radical protest actions. The negative 
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highlight goes to the Baltic countries but also to England and Ireland. Eastern 
Europe shows positive values, although they are not statistically significant.
Regarding this model’s explicative capacity for different models, it performs 
better at the level of latent participation (R2
  
=.129) and conventional manifest 
participation (R2
 
= 0.068) than at the level of latent participation related to the 
potential of political protest (R2
 
= 0.026) or non-conventional manifest participation 
R2
 
= 0.039) 8 (See Appendix A).
Subsequent, we tested the ‘civic voluntarism’ model, where political attitudes, 
closely related to socioeconomic status and education, were also an important 
reason for political participation: ‘people are more likely to participate if they feel 
informed, interested and efficacious, if they care strongly about the outcome, and 
if they think that they can make a difference. The independent variables we used 
were the following: the importance individuals give to politics, where they position 
themselves in the ideological scale (left vs. right) and their support for post-
materialistic values, the assessment of the government’s political performance and 
the state of their country’s economy. The dependent variables are the different 
types of participation. So what does the data show about the predictors of political 
participation here?
As we can observe in Table 4, in Appendix A, that role is stronger and statistically 
significant regarding latent political participation, where those for whom politics 
matters most and consume more political information position themselves to the 
left in the ideological spectre and share post-materialistic values. However, latent 
participation tends to decrease among individuals who negatively value their 
government’s performance and the economy. 
If we look at manifest political participation, namely conventional participation 
forms, Table 4 shows that only those who value the government’s political 
performance negatively resort less to such types of political action. At the same 
time, the assessment of the country’s economy is not statistically significant. On the 
other hand it is those who position themselves more to the right and share mostly 
materialist values those who use conventional political action more often. 
However, when we look at unconventional participation forms, we see that, 
except for the importance given to politics, all independent variables in the model 
determine the resort to the unconventional action repertoire in a statistically 
significant and negative way. In other words, the more to the left individuals place 
themselves, the higher their adherence to post-materialistic values and the more 
negative their assessment of government and the economy, the higher is their 
tendency to engage in unconventional participation forms. 
Finally, regarding the propensity to engage in radical protest as a form of latent 
manifestation, it is present among those who value politics, position themselves 
ideologically to the left and assess the state of the economy very negatively.
As to what concerns inter-regional differences, if we exclude the Baltic countries 
and Western Europe, they are practically non-existent at the level of latent 
participation. However, if we only take into account conventional participation 
regarding manifest participation, we have to exclude Northern Europe. As to 
unconventional participation, the Baltic countries are, again, the exception. 
Finally, this model’s explicative capacity is variable according to the forms of 
political participation at stake. Therefore we see the model performs better when 
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explaining conventional manifest participation (R2
 
= 0.440) and, even if to a smaller 
degree, also latent participation understood as interest in politics and cognitive 
mobilization (R2
 
= 0.173). The model’s performance declines when it comes to non-
conventional manifest participation (R2
 
= 0.067) and latent participation related to 
more radical potential political protest actions (R2
 
= 0.073) (see Appendix A)
Therefore, we tested the model resultant of the ‘social capital relational 
perspective’, using the different dimensions of social capital from the confirmatory 
factor analysis as independent variables and the different types of political 
participation from our confirmatory analysis as dependent variables.
Table 5, in Appendix, shows a strong, positive and statistically significant 
correlation between formal and informal social networks, social or generalized 
trust plus civic conscience and latent participation, understood here as interest in 
politics and cognitive mobilization. However, this is the weakest determination, 
although it is positive and statistically significant (p = .084).These observations 
partially confirm hypotheses H3a, H4a, H5a and H6a.  On the other hand, regarding 
conventional participation and with the exception of informal social networks, all 
the other dimensions of social capital tend to increase resorting to conventional 
participation. That is what occurs with civic conscience (ß =.114), systemic or 
institutional trust (ß= .10), formal social networks (b= .074) and also with social or 
generalized trust (ß= .027). 
The data apparently confirm the impact of formal social networks over 
conventional political participation, thus confirming the classical social capital 
approach, which focuses solely on formal and vertical voluntary organizations 
instead of informal and horizontal ones. If these data are correct, there is no 
determination replica between them and the different forms of conventional 
participation, which helps explain the primacy given to the first ones over the rest. 
The different dimensions of social capital determine all types of unconventional 
participation in a negative and statistically significant form, especially in the cases 
of systemic or institutional trust (ß= - .247), civic consciousness (ß= - .140) and 
social or generalized trust (ß= - .098), apparently confirming hypotheses H3b, H4b, 
H5b and H6b.
The negative and statistically significant effect of social capital dimensions is 
equally felt when speaking of latent forms of participation related to radical protest 
potential, including civil disobedience. In this case, the social capital dimensions 
that strikingly reduce this potential are formal social networks (ß = -.390), informal 
social networks (ß = -.152) and institutional trust (ß = -.115). Therefore, hypotheses 
H3b, H4b, H5b and H6b are confirmed. 
We can now conclude that social capital and its different dimensions amplify 
latent political participation understood as the interest for political life and cognitive 
mobilization over political affairs, as well as conventional political participation. On 
the other hand, they significantly reduce unconventional political participation and 
potential future political protest, thus being in accordance with the main social 
capital scholars regarding the relation with political participation. It should also 
be noted that, in inter-regional terms, there are no differences regarding these 




Finally, this model’s explicative capacity is variable according to the forms of 
political participation at stake. We see a better performance of the model when 
explaining latent participation related to potential protest actions including civil 
disobedience (R2
 
= 0.153), as well as latent participation understood as interest 
in politics and cognitive mobilization (R2
 
= 0.115). The model’s performance is 
also good at the level of conventional manifest participation (R2
 
= 0.108) and its 
explicative capacity increases when related to conventional manifest participation 
(R2
 
= 0.056) (see Appendix A)
At this point we should start addressing the central research hypothesis 3.The 
model proposed by the ‘social capital relational perspective’ strengthens the 
explicative capacity of citizen political participation proposed by other alternative 
theoretical models given by the ‘individual resources perspective’ or the ‘civic 
voluntarism perspective’. And our conclusion is that it is partially confirmed. Why?
When we have a regression model that gathers the proposed independent 
variables by all models and relates them to different participation types, we can 
see that both sociodemographic or biographical availability variables and variables 
related to political attitudes and values are statistically significant (can be negative 
or positive) and maintain almost unaltered (the level of significance doesn’t 
change). The same occurs with social capital dimensions. On the other hand, when 
we look at the explicative weight of this integrated model, we soon realize that it 
is the one that better predicts how citizens resort to the different types and forms 
of participation, showing an adjusted R2of .184 for latent participation understood 
as interest in politics and one R2 of .185 for latent participation seen as potential 
political protest or civil disobedience. Conventional political participation has an 
 
R2 of .442 and unconventional participation one 
 
R2 of .116. 
We can therefore conclude that none of the multiple linear regression models, 
when considered separately, presents a determination coefficient (R2) that explains 
the variance of dependent variables as high as this last model. This allows us to 
conclude, in line with Granovetter (1985), that the ‘social relational approach’ 
occupies the middle ground between two distinct ways of understanding human 
action and its consequences. So, there are good and justifiable reasons to state that 
in respect of political participation the ‘social capital really matters’.
Concluding Remarks 
This article mainly addresses the relations between social capital and political 
participation starting from two basic premises: the great proximity between both 
concepts, resulting from thesis on ‘the decline of political participation’ in recent 
decades in and outside Europe, but also from their insufficient and reductionist 
empirical operationalization. In social capital’s case, and looking to overcome one 
of Putnam’s biggest weaknesses, it consists of treating social capital as a one-
dimensional concept through a single additive index.
Our theoretical approach can be seen as a reaction to the unitary view of social 
capital and its effects. Our adopted view defends that social capital as a complex 
and multifaceted construct, which is constituted by different dimensions (structural 
and cultural) and that dimensions and sub-dimensions are linked to also diverging 
political participation repertoires. Our analysis confirms this hypothesis. 
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However, social capital has not been the only concept approached in an 
empirically reductive way. Such criticism is extendable to political participation. 
Based on Ekman and Amnå’s classification (2009), we showed that political 
participation is a multidimensional concept that also comprehends different 
dimensions and sub-dimensions. Therefore, within latent political participation 
we can fit interest in politics and cognitive mobilization, as well as more radical 
potential protest actions, while within manifest participation we find political 
participation forms traditionally seen as conventional and non-conventional.
Finally, and given the current challenges and contradictions regarding older 
explicative models of political participation, namely those proposed by the 
‘individual resources perspective’ and by the ‘civic voluntarism perspective’, we 
tested the most recent model presented by the ‘social capital relational approach’. 
We wanted to know if, and to what extent, motivations for individuals to take part 
in political activities could be reinforced by social capital’s dimensions – social 
networks, social and institutional trust and civic norms that add incentives to 
overcome self-interest and utilitarian actions.
In order to test thesehypotheses we used successive multivariate regression 
analyses, related to the three explanatory models of political participation. Finally, 
we build an integrative regression model with the variables that are specific to all 
previous models in order to compare their explanatory performance with each 
other. We could saw that the explicative capacity of the last model showed a high 
increase for all political participation categories with the introduction of structural 
and culturaldimensions of social capital. This leads us to conclude that, concerning 
political participation, ‘social capital really matters’.
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